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ABSTRACT
Federal  Reserve  behavior  is analyzed  usjng  a model  which  incorporates  an
effect of fiscal  pressure  on monetary  policy formulation.  Incentive
structures are hypothesized  to be such  that the central bank  plans  over a
'I 
onger hori  zon than that  rel evant to the admi  n  i strati on  .  Wi  th the
cyclically  adjusted  deficit  proxying  for fiscal  pressure  from  the
administration, the response  to the deficit  then plays an interactive role
in affecting the trade-off wejghts  applied  to the competing  goais  of
monetary  policy.  The  model  performs  well for the U.S., and  provides  a
pattern of pol  icy that is  stable over the full  1961-1983  period.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Recent  empirical  work  has  cast doubt  both on the stabjlity  of the Federai
Reservers  reaction functjon and  on the possjble link  between  defjcit
accommodation  and  monetary  po1icy.1  Instabiljty  across  presidentiai
administrations  has, in particular,  been  found  by Froyen  (\974), Luckett
and  Potts (1978)  and  Hamburger  and  Zwick  (1981,  1982).  Indeed,  Luckett  and
Potts obtain evidence  of a shift  jn monetary  policy between  each  of the
Eisenhower,  Kennedy-Johnson,  and  Nixon-Ford  admini  strations.  Most  notable
is the apparent  passage  from  a domjnant  price-stabjlity  objective under
Eisenhower  to an emphasi  s on ful I-employment  under  Kennedy-Johnson.
Hamburger  and  Zwick  meanwhile  fjnd  structural breaks  to coincide, first,
with the accedence  of Kennedy,  and, second,  with the brief  tenure  of the
Ford  adminjstration.  In short, there appears  to be at least some  support
for the following viewpoint  expressed  by Weintraub  (1978,  p. 356):  IFrom
the Accord  until  now,  much  of the history of monetary  pol  icy can  be
explained  just  by notjng  vrho  the Presjdent  was  when  the policy under  revjew
was  i  n effect.rr'
One  method  of dealing  with the implied structural shifts  is to correct
for them  by using  a dumrny  variable technique  (A1  1en  and  Smith, 1983).
However,  in this  paper  i  show  that .it is  possible  to identify  a stable
pattern of Federal  Reserve  behavior  by use  of a model  that internalizes the
influence  of admjnistratron  pressure  on the central bank.3 In the
analysis, the cyclically  adjusted  deficit  is used  as a proxy  for this
pressure  --  with the deficit  jn fact playing a multipljcative  role.in
i  nfl  uenci  ng the trade-off wej  ghts attached  to stabi  1  i  zati  on goa1s. The-L-
postulated  scenarjo  is one  in whjch  the objective function of the
admjnistration  together  with that of the central bank  jointly  determine  tne
course  of monetary  po1  i  cy.
2. DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  MODEL
The  focus  on fiscal  pressure  as a determinant  of monetary  pol  icy
presupposes  a distinction  between  the respective  loss functions  adhered  to
by the monetary  and  fiscal  authorities.  0therwise,  the central bank  woula
already  be conforming  to the pattern of behavior  desired  by the fiscal
authority and  there would  be no apparent  basis for  any  confl  ict.  The
fundamental  question  here  is  in fact taken  to be that of the time horizons
that are relevant  to the tt'o bodies.  Indeed,  the length and  staggered
nature  of the terms  of office given  to the governors  of the Fed  implies an
incentive  to consider  future implications  of current policy.
The  importance  of a time horizon  extending  beyond  the next election has
been  pointed  to by Buchanan  and  Wagner  (1977),  who  emphasise  the inherently
sh0rt-term  nature  of the incentives  facing politicians.  In addressing  the
implications  of thjs  for anti-jnflationany policy it  is certainly relevant
that the economic  payoffs  resulting from  a contractionary  monetary  policy
are delayed,  while an adverse  impact  on interest rates and  output tends  to
be immediate. Furthernore,  in terms  of the reputational impl  jcations
discussed  by Earro  and  Gordon  (1983a,b),  it  is  indeed  the policymakerrs
discount  rate Lhat js crucial in determ.i  ning whether  the policymaker
fongoes  the short-term  benefits available from  unanticjpated  jnflat.ion in
order to secure  the gain from  1ow  average  inflaljon  over the longer  term.-J-
In the Barro  and  Gordon  model  it  js  shown  that,  ceteris paribus, the lower
the discount  rate, the closer the outcome  to the model's  opt,imal  solution
'in  which  the policymaker  fol lows  a zero money  growth  rule.
The  central bank  and  government  are depicted  as having  distinct  loss
functions related to a range  of economic  variables.  These  variables are
embodjed  jn the vector Ya, and  are associated  wjth the corresponding  set of
rk
target values  Y*. These  targets are assumed  here  to be common  to both
central U.nt .nO  government.  The  respective  weights  attached  to deviations
from the targets can be represented  by Q, and  Q, beiow:
LcB = (Y. - Yt)'Q1(Yt  - Yt)
LGOV  = (Y.  - Vrl'Ortv,  - vil
(1)
(2)
where  LCB is the loss function for the centnal  bank,
LGOV  is the loss function for the qovernment.
The  longer  view  that has  been  ascribed  to the central bank  would  be
expected  to result in Q, + Qr. ltre problem  faced  by each  policymaker  then
becomes  that of minimizing  the relevant loss function subject  to the
constraint represented  by the structure of the economy.  The  stochastic
process  determining  the realization of the set of endogenous  variables for
the system  can  be represented  by equation  (3).
Ya=Atda+BXt+utwhere  Y, is an N  x L vector of target var.iables,
Wa  is a K x I vector of policy instruments,
Xa is an  1,1  x I vector of predetermined  variables (lagged  values  of
the targets and  instruments),
A  is an N x K  matrix of coefficients of the instruments,
B  is an N,  l.1  matrix of coefficients of the predetermined
va  ri abl  es,
ua is an N  "  1 disturbance  vector.
Following  Wood  (1967), substitution of (3) into the appropriate  loss
function can now  be applied jn order to derive the optimal stl-ategy  for the
pol  icymaker. The  solution js illustrated  for the general  loss function
Minimizing  L with respect  to the jnstruments  and  solving for the
optimal strateqv. W,  . qives
r'  -
|-=(Yt-Yt)'Q(Yt-Yt)
|'/.  =CX. + DY. ttt
-,]
where  C = _(A'QA).A,QB,
(4)
(5)
D  = (A,QA)-IA'Q.-5-
If  Yt is taken  as bejng  uncorrelated  with Xt, then the solution collapses
simply  to a closed  loop rule contjngmt on past values  of the targets anc




where  e js equal  to DYa,  and  has  a non-zero  mean. Evolutjon  of the target
values  over time implies  that e js not necessanily  serially  independent.
The  outcome  of this  procedure  indeed  shows  C (and  e) to be a function, not
only of the systemrs  matrices  given jn (3),  but also of the relevant
weightings  of the trade-off between  target varjables as embod'ied  in Q.
Therefore,  a difference in trade-off weights, 
-.e. 
Ql * Qr, ,s seen  to
imply  a similar distinction between  the respective  optimal  response
pattenns  fon the central bank  and  government  --  even  were  the perceived
structure of the economy  to be identical and  both poljcymakers  to use  the
same  mode  I .
The  implication of the above  for the setting of policy may  now  be
considered  --  first  of all,  from  the perspective  of the government.  Here,
the governmentrs  direct control of fiscal  policy is  taken  to be embodied  in
the cyclically  adjusted  deficjt.  The  feedback  rule for the deficit  has  the
form
DEF'=oXr+eo (7)-6-
measune  of the cyclically  adjusted  deficit. where  OEFa  is a
It  i  s
government
i n  strument
al  so possi  b1e
would  fol low
in thi  s case
to defi  ne a corresponding
wene  it  setti ng monetary
js taken  to be the change
dec  ision rule that the
poi  i  cy.  The  relevant
in the monetary  base.4
DMBtov=BXt*.8 (8)
where  DMBa  is the change  in the monetary  base.
However,  it'i  s of course  the central bank  which  'i  s entrusted  with
direct control over monetary  policy.  In the feedback  rules (7) and  (8)
above,  the coefficient vectors and  error terms  are necessarily  a function
of Q, from  the governmentrs  loss functjon.  ltlere  the central bank  itself
able to set policy in an unconstrained  manner,  then formulation  of policy
would  be related to Q.,  from  the bank's  own  loss function (1) --  and  not at
.L
al1 to Q2.  The  reaction functjon is wrjt.ten  as
DMBIB=trXt+e{ (e)
To the extent that Ql I QZ, jt  could  be expected  that S I  t,  eU  + er.
At the same  time, the central bank  must  take into account  the potential
threat to  its  autonomy  arjsing  in cincumstances  of susta.ined  opposition  to
the government  --  with the aftermath  of the rCoyne  affajrr  in Canada
providing an illustration  of the dangers  .inherent  in any  prolonged  state of-t-
E
conflict."  Indeed,  the settjng of policy is examjned  now  'in the context of
an extended  loss funct'ion  for the central bank  which  al.lows  for the
influence  of pressure  that may  be exerted  by the govennment.  The  loss
assocjated  with this  pressure  would  relate to the perceived  threat to
central bank  autonomy.  The  extent of the pressure  is  itself  taken  to
depend  upon  the gap  between  the monetary  pol  icy which  the government  would
have  selected  itself  (from 8) and  the monetary  policy actually foliowed.
The  extended  loss function has  the form
A*A Lile  =  (yt  - vil'rirtv.  - vil (  10)
A
Q,  = o(nr)
and  q(0) = Q, ,  q(-) = Q2
where  pt is the pressure  exerted  on the bank  by the government.
In this  framework,  the impact  of the pressure  on the central bankrs
loss function is embodied  jn the function q, and implies  an altered
response  of the loss function to dev'iations  from  targe! values  for the
endogenous  vaniables.  That is,  as pressure  increases,  the central bank
could in effect be viewed  as compnomi  sing its  unconstrajned  trade-off
weights  so as to conform  more  with those  held by the government  and  in thjs
way  a1ieviate the source  of the pressure.  In the 1imit, the observed
trade-off weights  approach  those  nepresented  in Qr.-8-
In analyzing  the actual implications  of government  pressure  for the
setting of monetary  policy, the cycllcally  adjusted  defjcit  is  used  as a
proxy  for this pressure.  Here,  both the governmentts  feedback  rule for the
deficit  (7) and  desired  reaction function for monetary  policy (8),  are
functions of the trade-off weights  embodjed  in Qr, while the unconstrained
pol  icy reaction function for the central Uanf  (g]  js  jnstead  a function of
Q1  from  the central bankrs  own  loss function (1).  This suggests  that an
increase  in DEF  would  be associated  wjth an jncrease  in pressure  due  to its
implying  an increase  in the gap  between  actual monetary  pol  icy and  that
which  would  have  been  set by the government.
Interactjon between  the set of coefficients jn the monetary  base  and
the budgeL  deficit  has  previously  been  suggested  by Blinder (1983).
However,  Bljnder himself addresses  the possible jmpact  of central bank
economic  goals  on deficit  accommodation;  and  deal  s therefore  with the
reverse  of the direction of causality consjdered  here.  At the same  time,
the common  al  lowance  for a continuous  role for the constraint imposed  by
government  may  be compared  to the discrete  effect  suggested  in  the model
developed  by Frey  and  Schneider  (1981)  --  whose  analysis  may  be v.iewed  as
forming  the special  case  in which  there is an infjnitely  large value for p
and  discrete switch  to the poiicy preferred  by the government.6
In any  event, with the deficit  serving  as the proxy  for government
pressure,  we  have  the deficit  now  inducing  the modification  !o central bank
behavior  indicated  in the equations  above. The  general  form  of the
solution for monetary  policy becomes-v-
-_'^
DllB.={(DEFr)Xt*rrD (11)
where  tr, rather than being  a fixed parameter,  is  reiated explicjtly  to the
observed  full-employment  deficit  (with a lag structure cornespondjng  to
that of Xr).  In this way!  the governmentrs  loss functjon nov{  affects
monetary  policy through  the indirect channel  provided  by the deficit,  with
c0nrespond'ing  cent.ral  bank  response  to the associated  government  pressure.
As specifically shown  in Appendix  A for the inflation/  unemployment  case,
the djrection of the effect may  jtself  be predicted  directly  from  the
relative trade-off weights  ascribed  to central bank  and  government.
The  nature  of the dependence  of {  on the def  .icit is expressed  r'n  terms
of the simple  f  inear  approximation
rt={1  + r2DEFt (t2)
In order to address  the 'influence  of the different  policy negimes
associated  with the changing  composition  of the government,  estimation  of
this  framework  necessariiy  requires  test.ing  for  such  structural breaks  as
those  noted  in the Iiterature.  However,  the general  form  of the approach
is  in fact  found  to be  most  pertinent to the empirical investigation that
fol 
'lows.
3. ESTIMATION  RESULTS  FOR  THE  U,S.
In seeking  to explain  the rate of growth  of the monetary  base  (DMB),
the fjrst  step  is to select  a set of variables  that might  reasonably  be-10-
expected  to feature in the Fed's  objective function. Here,  the goals of
price,  jnterest rate and  employment  stabiiity  are represented  by series on
the rate of growth  of the GNP  deflator (DP), the tht"ee-month  treasury  bill
rate (TB) and  the unemp'loyment  r"ate  (UN).  Furthen,  the composition  of
federal spending,  as ref'lected  jn the rate of growth  of reai government
purchases  (DG),  is  introduced  into the model.T Followjng  the preceding
theoretica.l  analysis, the response  to these  var.iables  by the Fed  is  itself
taken  to be interactive with the deficit.  The  measure  used  is the
cyclically  adjusted  serjes calculated  by the Survey  of Current  Business
djvjded by trend GNP. The  equation  to be estimated  has  the form
DMBI  = 60  + :  69  Dl4Bt_g  +  f  rn DEFr_n  (13)
g=i  h=1
p
+s  fl.-+t-nFF  \DG. 4..-ii'i2--,t-i,--t-i
q
+  c  f  r  + a  nFF  \n0
a  ' 'i 1  ' 
i? "'' t-i /"' t-j
r
+t  (d,,  + 6,^ DEF.  ,  )TB. e  K.t  Kz  t-K'  L-K
k=1
+  y  (,r^. +,r-^ DEF.  -)trN L  L!  x,L  r-rc'"''t-g  "t
= 6O  *  E  69  DMBt_s  +  f  rn DEFr_n
s=1  h=1- 11-
ejl  ,ot_i  r  Ei2(utrr.uu,lt_j
.j1 DPt_j  + rr2(DEF.DP)r_.,
r
E  {rt TBt_r  + ok2(DEF.TB)r_k
s
I  6et  UNt_u*  {or(DEF.uN)r_u  + u,
where  additiona'l  1y included  are lagged  values  of the monetary  base  ano
the deficit  taken  separately.  The  former  allow for evolut.ion  of the targer
values  for the economic  variab'les  over t.ime  --  and  jn thjs way  may  remove
the serial correlation that would  otherwise  be imputed  to the error term.
The  deficit  here  once  again  represents  the jnf'luence  of government  pressure
on central bank  poljcy, with its  separate  presence  representing,  inter
alia,  a possible  effect on the targets as  welI as on the response  to the
economy.  It  can  be seen  that the postulated  dependence  of the feedback
rule coefficients on the deficit  itself  implies that each  economic  variable
be placed  alongside  a corresponding  interaction term in the estimation  --
giving a compound  variable with a lag structure synonymous  with that of the
basic economic  variable.
However,  given  that the actual length of the lag structure rernains
indeterminate  from  a theoretical perspective,. a tesl procedune  must  be
used  in order Lo  determine  the 1ag  lengths  m, n, p, q, r and  s in equation





minjmum  final  prediction error (FPE)  criterion.  This method  is appealing
in thal  it  trades-off the risk due  to bias when  a shorter 1ag  length is
selected  against rjsk due  to the increase  in variance  when  a hiqher  order
i  s chosen.
In applying  the FPE  criterion  to the model  the maximum  lag length is
set at six.  Each  variable js then tested in turn,  jnitia'l 1y holding  the
1ag  iength on the other variables  at the maximur.S  Th" estimation  itself
is over quarterly data from 1961:1  to 1983:4,  using  OLS. The  six quarter
limit  receives  some  justification  in that jn no case  does.the  FPE  criterion
choose  a iag length of more  than four for any  varjable.  The  significance
of the 1ag  lengths  selected  by the critenion is addressed  in Table  1, where
the 1ag  length selections  are seen  to in each  case  be signifjcant at the
one  percent  l  eve1  .  The  resul  ts  fol  I  ow  i  n Tabl  e 2.9
In proceeding  towal-d  the jnterpretation of Tab'le  2, the particular
outcome  of two  tests should  be noted.  Fjrst,  the joint  significance  of
the set of jnteractjon tepms  is  confirmed  by an F-test:
cfli ti ca  I
Fo  .o = 5.35 ) F/,.,  ,.,',..  = 2.68.  in this tvay,  the hypothesized y,oo  (u.u1.,1
modifjcation  of the central bank's response  to the economy  due  to the
deficit  is  indeed  supported  in the results. Second,  al  lowance  is made
for a possible  reactjon by the central bank  to international
developments  --  as encapsulated  in the balance  of payments  deficit  and
the exchange  rate with the U.K.  However,  when  the extra variables are
added  to the specification, the FPE  crjterion  in each  case  selects a laq
I  ength  of zero.Nevertheless,  even  without these  addjtions, Table  2 still  contains  a
formjdable  arnay  of coefficients.  Given  the dependence  of Fed  behavjor
on the deficit  as well as the economy,  interpretatjon is  necessarily
complicated. It  is  in fact  instructive to cons.ider  the specific
scenarios  in which  the deficit  is assigned  values  of one  standard
devjation above  and  below  the mean,  together  with that of the mean
'itself  .  The  results of  imposing  these  respective  levels for the deficit
are given  in Table  3.
Focusing  on the results for the sum  of the lags on each  variable,
the relevant sign pattern js as listed below:
aDMB  a(  aDMB/apc)
aDc <o 
aDEF  >  o
aoMB  o(oDMB,/aDl)
,op =o  -ffi-  'o











These  signs  general  ly  suggest  a most  plausible relationship between
the Fed  and  the adm'inistration. At one  standard  deviation below  the
mean  for the deficit  we  have,  first  of all,  the negative  response  to DG
that would  be expected  were  the Fed  attempting  to stabiljze the economy
by offsetting any stimulus  associated  with government  purchases. Most
importantly, the standard  precepLs  of countercyclical  pol  icy are
satjsfied by a contractionary  movement  of the monetary  base  in response-14-
to inflation,  and  positive response  with respect  to TB  and  UN. There  is
also a positive effect for the defjcit  taken  separately.
The  theoretical analysis implied  that fjscal  pressure  would  lead to
the countercyclical  response  being  exacenbated  for those  variables to
which  the administration  attaches  a relatively  greaten  wejght.
Conversely,  the response  should  be  damped  with respect  to an objective
such  as price stability,  which  is  instead  assumed  to be of relatively
greater concern  to the central bank.  As the defjcjt  increases,  the
otherwjse  negative  response  to DG  is  itself  almost  exactly reversed  if
we  considen  the case  of one  standard  deviation above  the mean. In this
way,  administration  pressure  'i  s seen  to induce  Fed  policy to support
rather than offset the movement  in govennment  purchases.
The  deficjt  induced  effect also operates  in the expected  direction
for DP  and  TB.  The  response  to DP  remains  negative  over the range
considered,  but js driven very close to zero as the deficit  reaches  its
upper  standard  deviation from  the mean. This is  of course  consistent
wjth the postulated  effect of the administrationrs  shorter time horizon
on the relative emphasis  attached  to price stabi  lity  --  and  the Fed  for
its  part having  to  rbend  with the windr and  reduce  the size of the
contraction  that would  otherwise  fol low.  The  negative  jnteractjon
effect on TB  suggests  that the administration  also cares  less about
persi  stently rising interest rates than  does  the Fed.  This would  not
imply that the admini  stration wants  higher interest rates (and such  an
event  would  certainly increase  its debt burden),  but rather that it
attaches  re'l  atively less weight  to the goal of jnterest rate stabjlity-1q-
than does  a body  whose  banking  rconstituencyr  jnterests must  necessarily
be closely linked to the state of fjnancial ,""k"tr.10
It  is,  however,  in the effect of the deficit  on the response  to UN
that the results appear  somewhat  implausible.  For instead  of the
expansionary  impetus  that would  be expected  to fo.l  low from
administration  focus  on the fu1  I employment  objective, we  instead
obsenve  a negative  effect.  At the same  time, though,  it  should  be
pointed  out that the (one  quarter) intel"action  effect  is  insignificant
at the five percent  leve1, and  that the overall response  to UN  remajns
well positive even  at one  standard  deviation  above  the deficitrs  mean.
Therefore,  it  is possible  that the fiscal  pressure  is directed solely
toward  accommodation  of the defjcit  and  support  for government
purchases,  with indifference  toward  the effect on stabilization
objectives.  Alternatively,  as v{ith the first  quarter (on1y)  interaction
effect  for DP,  thjs  could  be weak  evidence  of a short- ljved central
bank  resistance  to monetization  --  as suggested  in Bljnderrs (i982) game
theoretic analysis, which  depicts a Nash  equiljbrium  where  the central
bank  lowers  reserves  as the government  expands  the budget  deficjL.
In any  event, the results do certainly appear  to offer  insight into
the full  effect of fiscal  pressure  on slabiI  ization goals.  The  induced
sacrifice of price and  interest rate stability  is parlicularly  evident
The  crucjal question  remains,  however,  of whether  these  results are
sensitive to the sample  period.  According'ly,  the effect of successive'ly
excluding  each  of the presidential admini  strations jn the sample  is
evaluated  using  a Chow  test  for structural change. Test resulLs jnclude-16-
those  for the Nixon-Ford  years taken  both jointly  and  separately  --  in
vjew  of Hamburger  and  Zwickrs  claim thal a break  coincided  with the
brief  tenure  of the Ford  administration,
The  results are presented  in Table  4, and  are clearly consistent
wjth continuity over  the full  sample. It  is possible  that,  in allowing
the effect of changes  in the deficit  over time to be captured  in this
interactive fashion, the current specification in fact  jnternalizes the
apparent  source  of the instability  observed  el  sewhere. Indeed,
appl  ication of the same  Chow  test technique  in testing ovel"  the tenure
of the different  Fed  chairmen  further confirms  the stabilitv  of the
reacti  on functi  on.  11
Two  further tests,  however,  are undertaken. Fir  st,  a potentjal
break  coincidjng  with the transition to floating exchange  rates in 1973
'i  s considered. Second,  the effect of the 0ctober  1979  announced  change
in Fed  operating  procedures  is addressed. 0nce  again  the test
statistics  are insignificant at the five  percenL  level --  in the latter
case  concurring  wjth the findings of Hamburger  and  Zwick  (1982),  and
Hoffman,  Low  and  Reineberg  (1983).
Certainly, the apparent  robustness  of the specification to sample
period changes  offens valuable  support  for the model  .  It  derives
perhaps  from  the fact that the model  does  not impose  a separation
between  the response  to the deficit  and  the response  to economic
conditions.  Rather,  it  is al  lowed  that the Fed  may  directly  trade off
the desirabil  jty  of satjsfying government  debt requirements  with the
des'irability of stabil  izing economic  condjtions.4. CONCLUSIONS
The  analysis appears  to prov.ide  an empirically stable model  of monetary
policy.  Although  the ro'le  of the defjcit  is  crucial in prov.iding  an
indirect role for adminjstration  policy objectives, isolation of a
distjnct  set of policy objectives  on the part of the Fed  is also a
feature of the results. Support  for a relatively  greater concern  with
inflation  on the part of the Fed  may  be compared  to the uninh.ibited
'supply-side' cooperation  in producing  inflation  that is  suggested  by
19
Toma  (1982)."  Rather,  the implied  framework  js one  in which  there is a
state of persistent tension  between  the monetary  and  fiscal  authorities.
The  responsiveness  to fiscal  pressure  itself  implies  eventual  dominance
for the adminjstrationrs  preferences,  but with central bank  preferences
also exerting a significant impact  on the course  of monetary  policy.
This does  of counse  allow the position of the central bank  to extend
significantly  beyond  the rscapegoatr  role attributed to the Fed  by Kane
(1982).  Nevertheless,  the postulated  scenar,io  remajns  that of only a
very limited form  of independence  combjned  w,ith  a demonstrable  .impact  of
lhe deficit  on the trade-off weights  applied jn monetary  policy.Si  gni  fi cance  of
-18-
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DW  = 1.97
Con  sta  nt
DMB(  -  1)
DMB(  -2  )
DEF(  -  1)
DEF(  -2  )
Dc(  -1  )
DG(  -2  )
DEF.DG(-1)
DE  F.  Dc(  -2 )
DP(  -1)
DP(  -2)
nEtr  nD/  -1  \
DEF.  DP(  -2)
rB(-1)
rB(  -2  )
18(  -3  )
TB(  -4)





Interpretati  on  of the Results
with Assigned  Values  for the Deficit
Constant
DMB(  -1)
DMB(  -2  )
DG(  -1  )
DG(  -2)
DP(  -i )
DP(  -2  )
TB(-1)
TB(  -2  )
TB(  -3  )
TB(  -4)
uN(  -  1)
Deficit at One
Standard  Oeviation
Bel  ow  the Mean





-0  .  094
0.  643
-0  .869







-u .  Llo
0.088
0.201
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Mean  Leve  I








-0  .  053










Standard  Devi  ati  on
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-0  .  029
0.205
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Stability 0ver  the D.ifferent  Presidentjal  Administrations
Test Statistic
Kennedy-Johnson  excl  uded  (  1961:1-1968:4)
N  i  xon-Ford  excluded  (1969:1-1976:4)
Nixon  (only) excluded  (1969:1-1974:3)
Ford  (  on  ly)  excluded  (I974:4-7976:4)
Carter excl  uded  (  1977:  1-i980:4)





















The  material in this  paper  is adapted  from  my  ph.D.  dissertation
entitled  I'The  Interaction of Central  Bank  Behavior  with Fiscal
Pol  icymaking  and  the Political  Business  Cycle:  A Multi-Country
Study.rr (Houston,  Tex.:  University of Houston),  December  19g5.  I
am  grateful to Gerald  Dwyer,  my  chairman,  and  to the other members
of my  disserLation  comnittee  for their  guidance  throughout  the
underlying  analysis.  I would  also like to acknowledge  helpful
comments  received  from  my  coileagues  at the Federal  Resenve  gank  of
Dallas.  The  views  expressed  are those  of the author  and  do not
necessarily  reflect  the positions of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of
Dallas or the Federal  Reserve  System.
A lhorough  review  of the literature  on  money  and  deficits  is
provj  ded  by Dwyer  (1985).
in addressing  this  literature,  Havrilesky  (1986a)  further points to
shifts  in monetary  pol  icy being  specifically  related to changes  in
the political  al  ignment  of the government  --  with an increase  in
money  suppiy  growth  after government  changes  from  conservative  to
I  i  beral  .
Related  work  by Havri  lesky (1986b)  shows  that movements  in the
narrow  money  supply  can  be explained  by reference  to an index  of
monetary  policy pronouncemen!s  by admini  stration offjcials.  This
index is a weekly  sum  of all  lrial  I  Street Journal  art.icles over the




desire for easjer or tighter  monetary  policy.  The  results appear  to
support  the importance  of signaling from  the adminjstration  to the
Federal  Reserve,  with a further finding being  that this  signaling is
itself  motjvated  by changes  in economic  conditions.  Havrilesky  does
not find evidence  of any  systematic  stabjlization  poiicy on the part
of the Federal  Reserve  beyond  that indirectiy  imputed  by response  to
administration  signal  ing, however.
The  monetary  base  is an appealing  measure  of the stance  of monetary
po'l  icy due  to its  potential applicability  across  different time
periods  and  across  countrjes.  See  Lothian  (1976)  for arguments
negarding  the reiative constancy  of the characteri  stjcs of
h  i  gh-powered  money  .
The rCoyne  affair'  is djscussed  by 0'8rien (1964),  pp. 199-201.
Frey  and  Schneider  focus  on a distinction  bet\{een  two states of the
world, described  as 'conflictr  andIno conflictr  scenarjos. It  is
imposed  that in a position of conflict  --  which  is defjned  as
holding  whenever  monetary  and  fiscal  policy are seen  to be moving  in
opposing  directions --  the government  js able to simply rforce' the
bank  to conform  with the slant of fiscal  policy.  Despite  the rather
ad hoc  nature  of this approach,  Frey  and  Schneider  do in fact fjnd
empirical support  for an expansionary  stimulus  bejng  transmitted  to
the hlest  German  Bundesbank  under  this  so-defined  conflict  scenario.
The  Bundesbankrs  pol  icy instruments  meanwhi  le are seen  to exhibjt
the expected  ant  i-i nf  lati onary  stance  in times  of no confl  ict.
5.
o,7  .  Thi  s accords  wj  th certai  n optimal publ  i  c fi nance  considerati  ons
raised by Barro  (1979);  and  empirically with the signif  .icant  role
for this  variable found  by Blinder (1983).
8.  In order to correct for the large nunber  of right  hand  side
variables, the initial  selections  were  used  as the maxima  in a
second  application of the procedure. This in fact had  little  effect
on the final  specification, resultjng only in the eliminatjon  of the
third  and  fourth lags on DP.  (Both  of which  had  a t-statistic  below
t.
one).
For compari  son.  the results for the FPE  criterion  were  in fact
supplemented  by those  for the alternatjve CD-statistic described  by
Mal  lows  (1973).  Hene  the lag length selections  were  in facl
identical wjth respect  to the included  varjables, but with the Cp
criterion  at the same  time excluding  completely  DMB,  and  DG  and
DEF.DG.  Given  that the actual significance  of the latter  variables
is clearly demonstrated  in Table  1, it  appears  that the more
generous  FPE  select'ions  are indeed  the more  appropiate.  (Results
for the CO  1a9s  may  be found  in chapter  three of my  dissertation).
The  importance  to the Fed  of support  from iLs banking  constituency
has  been  stressed  both by Skaggs  and  Wasserkrug  (1983)  and  by
Fri  edman  (  1982  )  .
It  may  be noted  that the jnteractive role for the deficjt  was  also
found  Lo be consLant  accross  presidential elections.  That is,  only
in the case  of the 1972  election was  there even  veak  significance  of




each  eiection or just  over the second  and  third  quarters  of the
election year.  Further  al  lowance  for a sh'i  ft  in the interaction
terms  prior to presjdential elections --  and  hence  for an indirect
electoral cycle in monetary  policy of the type suggested  by Laney
and  Viillett  (1983)  --  also met  wjth negatjve  results.  The  present
findings may  in fact be set against  those  of Allen (1986),  whose
results jndjcate a signifjcant  interaction between  the electoral
cycle and  the change  in outstanding  government  debt.  AlIen's
approach  does  not allow for any  additional jnteraction between  the
fiscal  measure  and  Federal  Reserve  response  to stabil ization
objecti  ves, however.
This is  not to deny  Toma's  argument  that pursuit of discretionary
profits  provides  an incentive for  Fed  officials  to push  money
creation to the point where  there js maxjmum  wealth-transfer  from
the generai  public.  However,  unless  other factors such  as
reputation  and  support  of the banking  sector are given a zero
utility  v/eight,  the rationale for a greater concern  with
pnice-stabil  jty  on the part of the central bank  would  seem  to nemain
pertinent.  This indeed  concords  with conclusions  drawn  in studies
such  as that of Woolley  (1977,  p. 156),  who  slates:  rrThe  concern
which  unites virtually  a1l central bankers  js thejr  opposition  to
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In this appendix,  the effect of ar  increase  in pressure  on the
feedback  rule is calcu'lated  explicitly.  A function that has  the general
properties indjcated in (10) in the main  text  .i  s defined  as
A  -h  -l
0, =  a, .-P  * Q2  .-(i/o)
where  Q, is an N x N matrix
p  is a scalar.
rlaR  r.  A :::-  = rY  -  v  \rpn /v  _ Y -) ap  't/  "x1\ I 
t
Here,  the derivatjve of the loss function with respect  to pressure
can  be calculated  to be
ilrR  ^  'k  A  * :::-  =  :  (Y  _V\rnlv  _v\
aP  aP  Ut  '  t'l v1\'t  't)
= (Yt  - vi)'f-0, e-p  +  (1,zpz)Q, 
"-(r/v),
-D  -f  1  /n'l
"  (Qt e'  * Q2  .  \-.Pi)(yt  _ yr)




where  R  = -Q1e-P  * 0/pz)QZ  "-( 
1,zP)-42-
and  R is an N x N  matrix.
It  js  the case  that we  have  the expected  sign of tldeZrp ) 0 if  R is
positive definite.  That 
A  A
is, with Q1  positive definite,  RQI  is then  the
product  of two positive definite matrices  --  and  such  a product  is
itself  positive definite  (Graybi'l  l,  1983,  p. ZZ7).  For  p > 1, this
condition on R js  sati  sfied under  the assumption  that Q2  is  large
relative to Qr.  The  importance  of government  pressure  for central bank
behavior  is  now  exam.ined  in detai  I  in the ana'lysis  below.
The  nature  of the soiutjon for the central bankrs  optimal strategy
can  in fact be obtained  as illustrated  for the case  of equation  (4) jn
the text'  The  constraint represented  by the str"ucture  of the economy  is
as set-out in equation  (3).  Here  the closed  loop rule for monetary
policy, given  the explicit  form  of the extended  ioss function (A1),
Decomes
DMBI=FXt+cYt
=  -(A'[Qr 
"-P 
* QZ.-(l/n)ror-10,[Qr.-P  * q, e-(1/P)1e
(A4)
where  F  =  -11'fire;-1e,0ra
A  -1  A
c = (A'QlA)  ,A'Q1-A3-
= (A,[Qt  e-P  * Q2 
"-(1/n)1ay-1a'[Q,  "-l 
* Q, e-(1/u)1
t{i  th treated as before, we  have





Evaluation  of an effect  in pressure  on the feedback  rule requires
determjnation  of the derivatives aFlap  and  a'Flap'.  In view  of the
complex  nature  of the system  matrices,  these  derivatives are in fact
represented  for the.most  simple  case  of tvro  targets and  one  policy
instrument. Here  we  consider  the response  of the monetary  base  (DMB)
lagged  values  of 1.,  and  of x. --  which  for expositional 'rJ
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wi  th the following assumptions:
For  xi  as jnflation  -- 
"i 
t  0, bj t  O, Or-  r  O.
For x- as unemployment  --  ui 
I 
0, bj t  O, Or, '  O
The  assumptions  on a- and  a, reflect  the premise  that an increase  in
the growth  rate of the monetary  base  increases  the inflation  rate-4f,-
relative  to the target level (a.,  > 0),  but decreases  the unemployment
rate (a- < 0).  The  further assumptions  allow for a positive
relationship between  current levels of rhe target variables and  their
past values  (bi,  bj'  0), and  for the loss function to be jncreasing  in
both jnflation  and  unemployment  (qr.,  , qtj ,  0).
The  response  of the feedback  rule to pressure  itself  depends  upon
the derivative aFl0p.  Thjs is given  by
aFlap  = JIarbrO1.,
where
.jbjqtjl  - KIa.,b,'c2i 
"jbjqzj]
(A10  )
ipz + 17pz;.(P2-7/p)(a.2qz.  * arro2;)
(p2 *  t,zpz)e-(p2-1lp)(a-2qt.  + ar2911)
and  J > 0, K > 0 (by inspection).
of (A10)  for the behavior  of the monetary  base  maybe Theimplications
as fol lows
a(  oDl.lBlaxi  )
'zot,  )  )
'qij) 2orr))
ap
= J[a,bro11J  - K[a,brclJ  > 0
xj  = constant
(A11)-A6-
rlrofieur*,1  [
--rr--j*'  =.onrtun, 
='[loiotil  - KlarbrarrJ  ' 0  (A12)
I
whene,  in addjtion to the ear'l  ier  assumptions,  it  is  furLher imposed
that qii/qzj  > K,/J  > ctj/qZj.
This condjtion has  the central bank  attaching  a relatively  greater
weight  to inflation  than the governmenl,  with the government  .in  its  turn
placing a relatively  greater  weight on unemployment.  (As  would  be
indicated  by the longer  time horizon  that has  been  attrjbuted to the
central bank.)  Provided  that (K,zJ)  is  in fact bounded  by the respective
relative weights  attached  to inflation  and  unemployment,  this  then
implies that pressure  leads  to the response  of the monetary  base  to both
vaniables  being  more  expansionary  than it  otherwise  would  have  been.  in
the case  of inflation,  this does  not mean  that the observed  movement  in
the monetary  base  cannot  sti'l  I  be contractionary  --  rather that,  at the
very least, the contractjon  will  be less than that predicted  by (Ag) for
the unconstrained  case.  certainly,  it  can  be seen  that the (intuitively
plausible) assumptions  about  the trade-off neights lead  directly  into
testable hypotheses  regard.ing  the pattern of central bank  behav.ior.
Furthermone,  it  may  be noted  that (in  contrast to (Ag) and  (A9)) the
trade-off weights  of the government  now  appear  in the soiution alongside
those  of the central bank.  As pressure  is  increased,  the former  are
seen  to increasingly  dominate  the response  pattern embodjed  in the
feedback  rul  e.-47  -
However,  it  would  be expected  that the response  to the pressure
might  be decreasing  in p.  That is,  we  have  the modif.icatjon  !o the
feedback  ruie becoming  jncremental  ly  smaller  as the outcome  approaches
that consistent  with the tr"ade-off  weights  of the government  (Qr). This
gradual convergence  of  the feedback  rule  to  the government-  preferred
22
outcome  requires a F/ap <  0.  we  fjnd
3'Z5  = M[aibiqti
ap
ujbjqtjl  + NIa,bro2i
1  I'l',I- (A13)
wnere
M=
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'9r, + at2Q4 )(r - 1--l-_=lfp11ll
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and  M  <.  0, N  > 0 (with the sign on 14
(9r,  * 9r.) 7  (9.,, + q..)  --  itself
4J  TJ
Applyi  ng this yields
az  (  aDMB/ax,  )
0p2
xj  = constant
;
^2-1l6\
v  ',  vt(
2  Qr.'  * ar'9  r,
'I
i
29rr  t ar29r, x1  - (F+lxr=))
bei  ng unambi  guously  negative
impl  ied under  (A3).
= l.lla.b.o".l '  I  t'tl'
- N[a.'b.orrJ.  o (A14)
'tT
a,  (  a  oMB,i  axj  )
op2
=  M[arb5o1;J  - Nlarbrcrrl  . 0 (A1s)
xj  = constant
wjth the earl  ier assumptjons
equival  ent condi  ti on qn/qZi
The  expl  icit  sol  ut
a  scri  bed  to the ge
under  (A11)  and  (A12)  above,  and  for the
>  lN/t'4  | .  qt  j/92j.
ions certajnly appear  to accord  wjth the properties
neralized  loss function (10).in the main  text.  It  is/
-A9-
indeed  shown  that,  as pressure  increases,  the unconstrained  policy
response  (as given in (A8) and  (A9)) becomes  increas.ingly  compromised  --
with assumptions  regarding  the relative  trade-off v{ejghLs  leading
directly  to implications regard.ing  the direction of the effect on the
monetary  base.  Although  the analysis has  been  confined  to the scenario
with t\,/o  targets and  one  instrument,  it  js apparent  that the general
case  can  be vjeried  as being  analogous  --  so long as the number  of
targets always  exceed  the number  of instruments./
-410-
APPENDIX  B
U.S. Data  Sources  and  Definitions
All  data series are obtained  from  Citibase --  with the exception  of
TRNDGNP  which  is taken  from  de Leeuw  and  Hol  loway  (1983).
DflB  = I  os(|4BASE/MBASE(-1)  )
where  MBASE  is  the monetary  base  adjusted for  reserve requirement
changes  by the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of St.  Louis  (end  of quarter
figures).
DEF  = (-i  x BUDGET),zTRNDGNP
where  BUDGET  is the cyclically  adjusted  federal budget,  TRNDGNP  is
(middle  expansion)  trend GNP.
DG = log(GOV/GoV(-1))
where  GOV  is real federal government  purchases  (in  1972  dollars).
DP = log(PRIcE/PRICE(-1))
where  PRICE  is the GNP  deflator (1972  = 100)
UN  is the unemployment  rate.
TB  is the three-month  treasuny  bill  rate.
All  senies  with the exception  of TB  are seasonaliy  adjusted  at
source.